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Abstract 
Costs and benefits of everyday actions are often not known beforehand. In such situations, 
people can either make a choice “without looking” at the payoffs, or they can “look” and learn 
the exact payoffs involved before making the actual choice. Recent studies suggest that the 
mere act of looking at payoffs will be met with distrust by observers: “lookers” are both less 
trustworthy and perceived to be less trustworthy than “non-lookers”.  Here we extend this line 
of work by changing the measure of pro-sociality: instead of trustworthiness, we consider 
altruism. Does “looking at payoffs” signal self-regarding preferences? Do observers’ beliefs 
match decision makers’ actions? Two experiments demonstrate that: (i) the level of altruism 
among “lookers” is not different from the level of altruism among “non-lookers”, but (ii) 
“lookers” are perceived to be less altruistic than “non-lookers”. These results hold both when 
the measure of altruism is the choice whether to help or not in the so-called “envelope game” 
(Experiment 1) or when the measure of altruism is the donation in a standard Dictator Game 
(Experiment 2). In sum, these results uncover a perception gap according to which looking at 
payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not actually mean so. 
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Introduction 
Virtually all studies on human pro-sociality assume that decision makers know the 
exact costs and benefits of a pro-social action beforehand. While this assumption is helpful to 
develop theoretical models (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & 
Rabin, 2002; Capraro, 2013) and conduct behavioral experiments (Rapoport, 1965; 
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986; Camerer, 2003), in many everyday situations people do 
not actually know the exact payoffs involved beforehand, but can gather this information only 
in a subsequent stage. 
 Such situations abound in real life. For example, when a friend asks you to drive her to 
some store, before making your decision, you can decide to ask for additional information to 
learn the exact cost of helping (How far is the store? How long will it take?). Similarly, when 
a friend tells you he is in trouble and needs a temporary loan, before making your decision, 
you may ask him the exact amount he needs and when he expects to return it. Analogously, 
before deciding whether to join an ethical cause, you might or might not decide to gather 
additional information about how much effort (time and money) you need to invest for this 
cause. 
 One simple way to formalize this type of situations is by means of a two-stage 
decision problem with one decision-maker and one observer (see Figure 1). Initially, decision-
makers know that they will have to decide between “helping” and “not helping”. They know 
that helping leads to a fair payoff, while not helping is individually optimal. However, they do 
not know the exact payoffs. In Stage 1, decision-makers have to decide between “looking at 
payoffs” and “not looking at payoffs”. In case a decision-maker decides to look, she or he 
learns the complete payoff structure of the game, that is, she or he learns the payoffs for both 
players. Then, in Stage 2, decision-makers make their actual choice between helping and not 
helping. 
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Figure 1. The “envelope game” that we are going to use in Experiment 1. In Stage (1), the 
decision maker, Player 1, decides whether to look at the payoffs corresponding to “help” and 
“don’t help”, or not. If Player 1 decides to look at the payoffs, then she or he is informed 
about the complete payoff structure of the game, that is, she or he learns the payoffs for both 
players in both situations. In stage (2), Player 1 decides whether to help or not. Player 2 is 
passive and has no influence on the result of the game.  
 
 This decision problem is similar to the envelope game introduced for iterated 
interactions by Hoffman, Yoeli and Nowak (2015) and for one-shot games by Hilbe, Hoffman 
and Nowak (2015). These theoretical studies posit that “the mere act of considering one’s 
strategic options and gathering information about the possible costs and benefits of an action 
will be met with distrust” (Hilbe, Hoffman & Nowak, 2015).  
In agreement with this intuition, Jordan, Hoffman, Nowak and Rand (2016) found that 
“lookers” are both less trustworthy and perceived to be less trustworthy than “non-lookers” in 
a standard Trust Game.  
 Here we aim at extending this line of work by changing the measure of pro-sociality. 
Instead of asking ourselves whether “lookers” are less trustworthy than “non-lookers”, we ask 
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ourselves whether they are less altruistic than non-lookers, where altruism is defined as 
unilaterally giving money to an anonymous stranger.  
There is indeed one theoretical reason to expect that considering altruism instead of 
trustworthiness will lead to results which differ from those by Jordan et al. (2016). Hoffman et 
al. (2015) suggest that looking at payoffs will be met with distrust by observers because 
looking at payoffs signals that the decision maker is deliberating about the available choices; 
whereas, “non-looking at payoffs” signals that the decision maker is not deliberating and so 
he or she will be more likely to use heuristics (i.e., automatic choices that people internalize, 
because they are payoff-maximizing in real life interactions, and use as default strategies 
when they have no opportunity to reason about all available options). While both 
trustworthiness and altruism are not payoff-maximizing in one-shot anonymous laboratory 
experiments, they behave differently in terms of heuristics internalized from everyday 
interactions. Since most people’s everyday interactions are with friends, family members, and 
coworkers, and thus they are repeated, people tend to internalize heuristics that are optimal in 
iterated games (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012; Rand et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2016; Capraro 
& Cococcioni, 2015). The crucial difference between trustworthiness and altruism is that the 
former is optimal in the long run, while the latter is not. Specifically, the standard way to 
measure trustworthiness is through the Trust Game, which is a positive-sum game. Thus, it is 
optimal in the long-run to be trustworthy, because the benefit of partner’s reciprocal trust 
overcome the initial cost of trustworthiness. Indeed, a meta-analysis of studies exploring the 
effect of promoting intuition versus deliberation in positive-sum games, including the Trust 
Game, shows that subjects tend to internalize trustworthiness as their default strategy (Rand, 
in press). This logic does not apply to altruism: unilaterally giving money is zero-sum, and 
thus altruistic behavior is never optimal, neither in one-shot, nor in iterated games. 
Consequently, the amount of altruism should not depend on whether a person is deliberating 
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or not. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of 22 experiments has shown that promoting intuition 
over deliberation has no effect on altruistic behavior (Rand et al., 2016).  
Taking into account this theoretical difference between altruism and trustworthiness, 
we formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis. Subjects who look at payoffs are not significantly less altruistic than those 
who do not look at payoffs. 
 We test this hypothesis by means of two experiments, which demonstrate that indeed 
(i) “lookers” are not less altruistic than “non-lookers”. Interestingly, in doing so, we also 
uncover a perception bias according to which (ii) “lookers” are perceived to be far more 
selfish than they actually are.  
In sum, we show that looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not 
actually mean so. 
 
Experiment 1 
 As mentioned above, we aim to (i) measure a possible change in observers’ beliefs 
about decision-makers’ levels of altruism, caused by knowing that the decision-maker has 
decided to look at the cost of helping before making their decision, and (ii) measure whether a 




 Subjects were living in the US at the time of the experiment and were recruited using 
the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010; 
Horton, Rand & Zeckhauser 2011, Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). In none of the studies 
presented in this paper an a priori power analysis was conducted, but the planned sample sizes 
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were based on previous studies investigating behavioral changes in games involving pro-
social behavior (Capraro, Jordan & Rand, 2014). 
 Each of 1,088 participants (57% males, mean age=32) was randomly assigned to one 
of seven conditions and passed standard comprehension questions to make sure they 
understood the decision problem at hand. Any subjects that did not pass the comprehension 
questions were automatically excluded from the survey. The seven experimental conditions 
were as follows. 
 Received. In this condition all participants were decision makers, to whom we asked to 
decide between Option A and Option B. Option A would give 20c to both themselves and the 
person they were paired with (participating in the Guess Received condition described below). 
Option B would give 30c to themselves and 10c to the other person. 
 Denied. This condition was similar to the Received condition, but decision makers 
(paired with participants in the Guess Denied condition) were not told the payoffs 
corresponding to the two options. Moreover, participants were not given the choice to learn 
them. The only information they had was that, if they chose Option A, then both themselves 
and the other participant would receive the same amount of money, while, if they chose 
Option B, they would get more money at the expenses of the other participant. 
 Choose. This condition was similar to the Denied condition. Participants were told that 
Option A would allocate the same amount of money to themselves and the other participant, 
but Option B would maximize their payoff at the expenses of the other participant. After 
giving this piece of information, we asked participants whether they wanted to know the exact 
amounts of money corresponding to each of the two options. As in Jordan et al. (2016), 
finding out the cost of helping was costless. In order to minimize confounding factors (e.g., 
moral cleansing), participants were not told that their decision whether to look at payoffs or 
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not would be communicated to an observer. Depending on their choice, these participants 
were paired with observers in the Guess Chose Yes and Guess Chose No conditions. 
 Guess Received. Each participant was grouped together with two other participants, 
named Person 1 and Person 2 (Person 1 participating in the Received condition and Person 2 
participating in the Guess Received condition). Participants were shown the screenshots of the 
instructions presented to Person 1 and had to guess Person 1’s decision. Correct guesses were 
incentivized with a $0.20 prize. We measured beliefs from the point of view of a third-party 
to avoid that risk-averse people edge, that is, they bet on a donation of 0 thinking that, in case 
they lost, they would at least receive the donation (d’Adda, Capraro & Tavoni, 2015).  
Guess Denied. This condition was similar to the Guess Received condition, but 
participants were shown the screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers 
participating in the Denied condition. 
 Guess Chose Yes. This condition was similar to the previous ones, but participants 
were shown the screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating in the 
Choose condition, who decided to look at payoffs. Observers were communicated also the 
payoff structure of the game, and not only that the decision maker decided to look at the 
payoffs.  
 Guess Chose No. This condition was similar to the previous ones, but participants 
were shown the screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating in the 
Choose condition, who decided not to look at payoffs. 
 
Results and discussion 
 Visual evidence of the results is provided in Figure 2. Apart from the condition in 
which decision makers were given the choice to look at the payoffs and decided to do so, 
observers’ beliefs about decision makers’ behavior look very accurate. The only apparent gap 
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regards the condition in which decision makers decided to look at the payoffs. The figure 
suggests that looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not actually mean so. 
 
 
 Figure 2. Proportions of altruistic choices across conditions. Error bars denote the standard 
error of the mean. The first, the second, and the fourth pair of columns provide visual 
evidence that observers’ beliefs about decision makers’ behavior match actual choices in all 
conditions, save the one in which decision makers decided to look at the payoffs before 
making their decision. The third pair of columns indeed provides evidence that participants 
looking at the payoffs were perceived to be highly more selfish than they actually are. We 
refer to the Main Text for detailed statistical analysis. 
 
 To confirm this intuition, we now report formal statistical analysis. We define a 
variable, named “guess”, which takes value 1 if a subject played as observer, and 0 if a 
subject played as Person 1. Next, we define a variable, named “helping”, which takes value 1 
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for subjects who played in the role of Person 1 and decided to help, and for subjects who 
played as observers and guessed that the corresponding Person 1 would help; and takes value 
0 otherwise. Logistic regression predicting the probability of “helping” as a function of 
“guess” shows that in the cases of denied payoffs (c2(1,320) = 3.817, coeff = 0.071, z = -
0.299, p = 0.765, difference between means = 2%), received payoffs (c2(1,324) = 2.123, coeff 
= -0.192, z = 0.841, p = 0.400, difference between means = 5%) and choosing not to know the 
payoffs (c2(1,155) = 1.800, coeff = -0.330, z = 0.653, p = 0.513, difference between means = 
7%), there is no statistically significant difference between the choices of decision makers and 
observers’ beliefs. Hence the beliefs about Player 1s’ actions are not significantly different 
from their actual actions. However, results differ when the decision maker chooses to know 
the payoffs. In this case, there is a strong statistically significant difference between the 
decisions of the participants acting as Player 1 and observers’ predictions of their choices 
(c2(1,289) = 17.90), coeff  = -0.999, z = 3.901, p < .0001), with a difference between mean of 
23%. Taken together, these results provide evidence for a strong gap according to which 
subjects looking at the payoffs are perceived more selfish than they actually are, and, 
importantly, this gap is not due to an underlying gap regarding the amount of altruism in 
others. 
 Next we examine whether this gap is driven by Player 1’s actual altruism or by the 
beliefs about Player 1’s altruism, or both. To do so, we compare the Guess Received condition 
and the Guess Chose Yes condition by conducting logistic regression predicting “helping” as a 
function of a dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the subject participated in the Guess 
Chose Yes condition, and 0 otherwise. Results show that observers believe that “lookers” are 
less altruistic than subjects to whom payoffs are given by default (c2(1,269) = 9.175, coeff = -
0.567, z = 2.130, p = 0.033), with a difference between means of 12.5%. Similarly, we 
compare participants in the Received condition and participants in the Choose condition, who 
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decided to look at the payoffs. Logistic regression shows that participants who looked at the 
payoffs tend to be more altruistic, but not significantly so (c2(1,344) = 1.556, coeff = 0.241, z 
= 0.217, p = 0.266, difference between means = 6%). These results provide evidence that the 
aforementioned gap regarding the level of altruism of subjects who decide to look at the 
payoffs is mainly driven by a gap in observers’ beliefs about decision makers’ level of 
altruism. 
 Finally, we investigate whether not looking at payoffs signals altruistic behavior. 
Similar analysis as before shows that the level of altruistic behavior among “non-lookers” was 
not significantly different from the level of altruistic behavior among subjects to whom 
payoffs were denied by default  (c2(1,271) = 2.768, coeff = -0.003, z = 0.012, p = 0.990, 
difference between means = 0.1%); moreover, the level of perceived altruistic behavior 
among non-lookers was not significantly different from the level of perceived altruism among 
subjects to whom the payoffs were denied by default (c2(1,204) = 2.951, coeff = 0.398, z = -
0.798, p = 0.424, difference between means = 9%). However, we mention that the proportion 
of people who decided not to look at payoffs was so small (around 10%), that it is possible 
that the lack of a significant effect is due to an undesired lack of statistical power. 
       
To summarize, Experiment 1 provides evidence that subjects who look at the payoffs 
are perceived to be much more selfish than they actually are1. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Our first experiment suggests that subjects who look at payoffs are perceived much 
more selfish than they actually are. One potential explanation for this gap is that the act of 
looking generates a moral cleansing effect (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009). Moral cleansing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1All these results are robust after controlling for sex, age, and level of education. 
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theory posits that people have a positive moral conception of themselves and that they strive 
for balance in their moral acts to maintain this positive concept. In other words, when people 
do something that they think it is morally wrong, they need to subsequently do something that 
they think it is morally right to compensate for it (Brañas-Garza, Bucheli, Paz Espinosa & 
García-Muñoz, 2013; Bandura, 1991; Dunning, Fetchenhauer & Schlösser, 2012; Dunning, 
2007). In this light, it is possible that, in our first experiment, some decision makers were 
aware of the fact that choosing to know every detail of the decision problem, if communicated 
to observers, would be perceived with distrust. Since this action then tips the moral balance 
towards bad behavior, these agents may have felt the need to compensate their behavior by 
helping at the next occasion.  Although we tried to minimize moral cleansing effects by not 
communicating to decision makers that their decision whether to look at payoffs or not would 
be shown to an observer, it is possible that some decision makers experienced a feeling of 
deep-rooted, non-consequentialist guilt anyway, and were motivated to subsequently act 
altruistically. 
 To avoid this potentially confounding factor, we build on a previous work by Brañas-
Garza et al. (2013). Specifically, in Experiment 2 decision makers play two games: they first 
play an envelope game and then they play a dictator game in the role of dictators. Observers’ 
beliefs are elicited in the dictator game, conditional on whether decision makers decided to 
look at the cost of helping in the envelope game. Since Brañas-Garza et al. (2013) showed 
that in games involving altruism (iterated Dictator Game), moral cleansing does have an 
effect, but such an effect persists for only one round (i.e., the choice at round t is negatively 
correlated to the choice at round t-1), the idea is that any moral cleansing effect, if present in 
our experiment, should remain confined to the first envelope game and affect only the 
decision whether to help or not in the envelope game, and not the decision in the subsequent 
dictator game. Thus, comparing the average donation of dictators who opted for knowing the 
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cost of helping in the envelope game with the average donation of dictators who opted for not 
knowing the cost of helping, we can see whether looking at the cost of helping is associated 
with selfish behavior or not.   
 
Method 
 A total of 240 brand new subjects (50% males, average age = 35.4 years), living in the 
US, were recruited on AMT and randomly divided in two conditions, the active condition and 
the passive condition.  
Participants in the active condition played two games. In Stage I, they were given 
$0.20 and they were told that they could “help” another participant, who was given nothing. 
Helping means transferring an amount c > 0 to a participant in the passive condition, who 
started with no money. Active participants were also informed that, before making their actual 
choice, they could find out the exact value of c. Thus, in total, active participants in Stage I 
made two decisions: first, they decided whether to find out the value of c; and then, they 
decided whether to help the other participant. Hence, the Stage I game is strategically 
equivalent to the envelope game used in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1 and as in Jordan et 
al. (2016), finding out the cost of helping was costless. Moreover, as in Experiment 1, 
participants were not informed that their decision about finding out the cost of helping would 
be communicated to an observer. In Stage II, active participants played a standard Dictator 
Game (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986) with another passive participant, different from 
the one they were paired with in Stage I. Precisely, subjects were given another $0.20 and 
they were asked how much, if any, they wanted to give to the other player.  
Apart from being receivers in both Game I and Game II, participants in the passive 
condition were also asked to guess the behavior of a randomly selected active participant in 
Game II, conditional on whether that participant chose to look at the cost of helping in Stage I 
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envelope game. Specifically, passive participants were shown all the screenshots given to 
active participants in Stage I and Stage II, and, after being informed about whether that active 
participant chose to look at the cost of helping in Stage 1 envelope game, they were asked to 
guess the active participant’s donation in the Stage 2 dictator game. Correct guesses were 
incentivized with a $0.20 reward. Importantly, subjects were informed only about whether 
active players decided to find out the cost of helping or not, and not about the subsequent 
decision whether to actually help or not. 
All participants (both active and passive) were asked comprehension questions to test 
for their understanding of the decision problem. Participants failing any comprehension 
questions were automatically excluded from the survey. 
 
Results and discussion 
 Figure 3 summarizes the results and provides visual evidence that, in line with 
Experiment 1, also in Experiment 2 “lookers” were perceived to be far more selfish than they 
actually were. 
In order to formally support this, we begin by exploring whether active participants 
who looked at the cost of helping were actually more selfish than those who decided to make 
a choice without looking. To this end, we conduct linear regression predicting Stage II 
donations of active participants as a function of a dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the 
subject decided to find out the value of c in Stage 1, and value 0 otherwise. Results show that 
the average level of altruistic behavior among “lookers” was not statistically different than 
that among “non-lookers” (F(1,126) = 0.2808, coeff = 0.2676, p = 0.5971, r2 = 0.0022, 
difference between means = 2.7%) 
 Next, we analyze whether looking at the cost of helping was perceived as a signal of 
selfishness. To this end, we compare the average guess by passive players paired with “active 
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lookers” with the average guess of passive players paired with “active non-lookers”. Linear 
regression shows that finding out the cost of helping is a strong signal of selfish behavior 
(F(1,110) = 27.7942, coeff = -2.1607, p < .0001, r2 = 0.2014, difference between means = 
21.6%)2. 
In sum, Study 2 finds that the perception gap found in Study 1 - that looking at the 
cost of helping is a signal of selfish behavior, but it does not actually predict selfish behavior - 
extends to a context in which moral cleansing is, at least partially, ruled out. 
 
 
Figure 3. Average choice in dictator game (donation or guess) across conditions. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. Average donation (normalized such that full 
donation is equal to 10) among people who decided to look at the cost of helping in Stage I 
was not different from average donation among people who decided not to look at the cost of 
helping. However, people who decided to look at the cost of helping were believed to be 
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significantly more selfish than those who decided not to look at the cost of helping. We refer 
to the Main Text for detailed statistical analysis.  
 
General discussion 
 In daily life, people often do not know the exact costs and benefits of a pro-social 
action beforehand, but can gather this pieces of information only in a subsequent stage. 
Starting from this observation, recent studies have started exploring how observers interpret 
the decision maker’s act of “looking at payoffs”. Theoretical models propose that looking at 
costs and benefits will be met with distrust by observers (Hoffman, Yoeli & Nowak, 2015; 
Hilbe, Hoffman & Nowak, 2015), and, in agreement with this prediction, Jordan et al. (2016) 
showed that “lookers” are both less trustworthy and perceived to be less trustworthy than 
“non-lookers”.  
 In this paper we have explored whether these results extend to altruistic behavior. In 
doing so, we uncovered a perception gap according to which (i) “lookers” are perceived to be 
far less altruistic than “non-lookers” (differences between means always above 20%), but (ii) 
“lookers” are not significantly less altruistic than “non-lookers”. 
 Specifically, Experiment 1 shows that “lookers” in the envelope game are not 
significantly less altruistic than subjects to whom payoffs are given by default, suggesting that 
the mere act of looking is not associated with selfish behavior. However, observers do believe 
that looking at payoffs is associated with selfish behavior, that is, they believe that “lookers” 
help less than people to whom payoffs are given by default. The size of this perception gap 
turns out to be enormous, as the difference between percentage of actual helping and belief is 
around 23%. 
 One potential explanation for this gap is that looking at payoffs generates a moral 
cleansing effect (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009), which is not anticipated by observers. 
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Perhaps, “lookers” are aware of the fact that choosing to know every detail of the decision 
problem will be met with distrust by observers. Since this action tips the moral balance 
towards bad behavior, some lookers may have felt the need to compensate their behavior by 
helping at the next occasion.   
 To avoid this potentially confounding factor, Experiment 2 implements a slightly 
different design in which the measure of altruism is not taken inside the envelope game, but 
through a subsequent dictator game. This experimental setup ensures that any moral cleansing 
effect, if existent, would remain confined to the envelope game (Brañas-Garza et al., 2013). 
The results of Experiment 2 confirmed those of Experiment 1: (i) “lookers” are perceived to 
be far less altruistic than “non-lookers”, but (ii) “lookers” are not significantly less altruistic 
than “non-lookers”. The size of the effect was also comparable to that in Experiment 1 (21%). 
 Since the measure of altruism in Study 2 was taken in a different task than the one in 
which the decision whether to look at the payoffs was made, another interesting consequence 
of Study 2 is that it seems to imply that the decision to look at payoffs is perceived by the 
other participant as being reflecting some sort of personality trait, not limited to the task in 
which the decision to look was made. This is in line with the research on the “cooperative 
phenotype”, suggesting that pro-social choices made in different situations are positively 
correlated (Capraro et al., 2014; Capraro, Smyth, Mylona & Niblo, 2014; Peysakhovich, 
Nowak & Rand, 2014; Biziou-van-Pol et al., 2015). 
 Our findings diverge from previous results by Jordan et al. (2016), who found that 
“lookers” were less trustworthy and perceived to be less trustworthy than “non-lookers” in a 
standard Trust Game. As discussed in the introduction, a potential explanation for this 
difference comes from the analysis of the theoretical reason which has been proposed as the 
ultimate explanation for why “non-lookers” should be more pro-social than “lookers”. 
Specifically, Hofmann et al. (2015) propose that non-looking at payoffs signals that decision 
Looking	  at	  payoffs	  signals	  selfish	  behavior,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  so	  	  	  	  	  18	  	  
	   18	  
makers will be using heuristics internalized from everyday interactions, rather than reasoning 
about the particular payoff structure of the game. The crucial difference between 
trustworthiness and altruism is that, while being trustworthy is optimal in repeated 
interactions and thus it may be internalized as a useful heuristic (because most everyday 
interactions are with friends, family and coworkers, and thus they are repeated), altruistic 
behavior, being zero-sum, is not optimal in repeated interactions. Consequently, altruistic 
behavior should be independent of participants’ cognitive reflection mode. 
Although this point of view explains why “non-lookers” are more trustworthy than 
“lookers”, but they are not more altruistic than “lookers”, it does not straightforwardly explain 
why “non-lookers” are perceived to be more altruistic than “lookers”. One possibility is that 
observers overgeneralize to the Dictator Game their correct experience about the Trust Game. 
Of course, this is only one potential explanation, and we hope that future research will help 
explore this and other potential frameworks. 
Another interesting question for future research is understanding why people look at 
payoffs. Are they considering their own payoff, or the payoff of the other person, or perhaps a 
combination of both? Are lookers aware of the fact that their behavior can be perceived with 
mistrust by observers? If so, why do they look at the payoffs? We believe that exploring these 
questions can highly improve our understanding of human behavior in situations that are 
common in people’s everyday lives. 
To conclude, the two experiments presented in this paper uncover a perception gap 
according to which looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior but it does not actually mean 
so. Since interpreting others’ actions in a correct way is crucial for healthy social 
relationships, we believe that understanding the origin of this gap and its potential 
consequences for human behavior is an important direction for future research. 
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